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THE SURVIVAL OF CUSTOMARY LAW
IN THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS
By
Elizabeth Barrett Ristroph*

Abstract:
The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”), a U.S. territory located in the Pacific
Ocean just north of Guam, is one of few American jurisdictions in which the traditional cultural practices celebrated
by a minority of the population have the force of law. Problematically, many of these laws are uncodified and no
longer practiced by the majority of people in the jurisdiction. The CNMI judiciary often stumbles through cases of
first impression with no guidance from the CNMI legislature, resulting in conflicting case law. This article surveys
the customary law in place in the CNMI, and considers the obstacles of applying this law in a society whose culture
and customs are rapidly evolving.

*

Assistant Attorney, North Slope Borough Law Department, Barrow, Alaska. The author served as a law clerk for
the Superior Court from 2005 to 2007 and was involved in many of the probate cases discussed in the article. Cases
cited are on file with the author. Only the CNMI Supreme Court cases after 1990 are available on Westlaw, although
Westlaw’s reporter citations are inaccurate.
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The Survival of Customary Law in the Northern Mariana Islands
There are few American jurisdictions in which the traditional cultural practices celebrated
by a minority of the population have the force of law, even when these practices are at times
uncodified, imprecise, and disputed. In 1975, after three centuries of foreign rule, the people of
the Northern Mariana Islands established such a jurisdiction—the Commonwealth of the
Northern Mariana Islands (“CNMI”). This article surveys the customary law in place in the
CNMI and considers the obstacles of applying this law in a society whose culture and customs
are rapidly evolving.

I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The Northern Mariana Islands was initially inhabited by the Chamorro people, who
arrived some 3500 to 4000 years ago.1 Spanish colonization, beginning in 1668 with the
establishment of a Jesuit mission, led to a dramatic decline in the Chamorro population.2 After a
series of revolts, the Spanish government relocated the entire native population from the islands
of Saipan and Rota in the Northern Marianas to the neighboring island of Guam.3 Not until the
late 19th century were the Chamorros allowed to return.4
Many aspects of traditional Chamorro culture collapsed as the surviving Chamorros
adapted to Spanish rule.5 Some aspects of the ancient culture were brought to light in the mid20th century with the work of archeologist Alexander Spoehr. Spoehr’s work, Saipan: The
1

SCOTT RUSSELL, TIEMPON I MANMOFO’NA: ANCIENT CHAMORRO CULTURE AND HISTORY OF THE NORTHERN
MARIANA ISLANDS 78 (1998).
2
Id. at 13.
3
Britannica Encyclopedia Online, Northern Mariana Islands History, http://www.britannica.com/eb/article273249/Northern-Mariana-Islands (last visited Jan. 30, 2008).
4
Dan MacMeekin, The Northern Mariana Islands: A Political-Legal Chronology 1521 – 1930,
http://macmeekin.com/Library/NMIchron/1521.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
5
RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 13.
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Ethnology of a War-Devastated Island (1954), is the only text consistently relied on by modern
courts to gain insight into traditional Chamorro culture and law.6
In the 19th century, the Refaluwasch, or the Carolinian people, immigrated to the
Northern Marianas from the neighboring East and West Carolinian islands7 and established
permanent settlements.8 Although they did adopt Christianity, the Carolinian people retained a
culture that was distinct from both Chamorro and Spanish culture.9 Today, there are more
vestiges of traditional Carolinian culture than of Chamorro culture, such as the wreath (known as
mar-mar) still worn by many Carolinians.10
Spain was forced to sell Guam to the United States at the end of the Spanish-American
War in 1898.11 Shortly after, the United States sold the Northern Mariana Islands to Germany in
1899.12 After World War I, the Northern Mariana Islands were mandated to Japan by the League
of Nations.13 In 1947, after World War II, the United Nations established the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, naming the United States as Trustee over the Northern Marianas and other
Micronesian islands.14
In 1975, the Northern Mariana Islands entered into a covenant with the United States
whereby the islands would become a semi-autonomous Commonwealth under the sovereignty of
6

See, e.g., Arriola v. Arriola, No. 97-049, 6 N.M.I. 1, 1999 MP 13 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999); In re Estate of
Aguida Amires, No. 95-012, 5 N.M.I. 70, 1997 MP 8, 1997 WL 33480210 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 12, 1997).
7
These include what is now the Federated States of Micronesia. See Alexander Spoehr, Saipan: The Ethnology of a
War-Devastated Island, in FIELDANIA: ANTHROPOLOGY 41, 326 (Chicago Natural History Museum, 1954) (“[T]he
main body of the Saipan group [of Carolinians] migrated from atolls lying just to the west and north of Truk.”).
8
Northern Mariana Islands Council for the Humanities, “About the CNMI,”
http://www.nmihumanities.org/about_cnmi.asp (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
9
Based on the author’s observations while living on Saipan from 2005 to 2007.
10
Id.
11
Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
12
RUSSELL, supra note 1, at 25.
13
DOI Office of Insular Affairs, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
www.doi.gov/oia/Islandpages/cnmipage.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2007).
14
Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands art. 3, July 18, 1947, 61 Stat. 3301.
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the United States.15 This Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands in Political Union with the United States (“Covenant”) spells out the division of power
between the United States and the local government.
The CNMI is generally subject to federal law and the U.S. Constitution, with the
exception of the Fourteenth and Sixth Amendments. In order to provide representation from each
of the populated islands, the Covenant disregards the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
guarantee of “one person, one vote.”16 Equal protection is also limited by prohibitions on the
alienation of land from people who are of not of Northern Marianas descent.17 The application
of the Sixth Amendment is limited by the Attorney General’s ability to prosecute some offenses
in the absence of a jury trial.18 The local government also currently maintains independent
control over immigration, customs, and taxation. This, however, may change with the passage of
bills pending in the U.S. Congress that provide for a federal takeover of immigration.19
The CNMI has a limited statutory code, which was not enacted until 1984.20 The
statutory code contains some specific provisions for applying traditional customary law,
primarily with respect to inheritance matters and the distribution of land.21 While most of the
statutory code is now comprised of public and local laws enacted by the CNMI Legislature,
15

Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States
of America, 48 U.S.C. § 1801, 94 Pub. L. No. 241, 90 Stat. 263 [hereinafter Covenant]. On November 3, 1986,
following the approval of the Covenant by Congress, a formal presidential proclamation terminated the Trusteeship
with the Northern Mariana Islands, thereby conferring United States citizenship on CNMI residents pursuant to
§301 of the Covenant. Proclamation No. 5564, 51 Fed. Reg. 40399. The United Nations officially terminated the
Trusteeship in December 1990. S.C. Res. 683, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2972d mtg. at 29 (1990).
16
Covenant, supra note 15, at § 203(c); see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (holding equal protection
requires that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned by population).
17
Covenant, supra note 15, at § 805(a).
18
Id. at § 501.
19
In December 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 3079, which provides for the U.S. federal
government to take over CNMI immigration. H.R. 3079 awaits Senate action as part of S. 2483, an omnibus bill
made up of some 50 House-approved bills. Agnes E. Donato, Federalization bill now heads to full US Senate,
SAIPAN TRIBUNE, Feb. 01, 2008, http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?cat=1&newsID=76623.
20
See Northern Mariana Islands Public Law 3-90, effective January 1, 1984.
21
See generally 8 N.M.I. Code.
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many provisions derive from pre-CNMI law.22 Further, Trust Territory law may still apply in
certain situations, such as in the probate of the estate of a decedent who died during the Trust
Territory time.23 To the extent that these laws are silent, courts apply uncodified customary law
(based on evidence offered by litigants) or U.S. common law (depending on the area of law).24
Given its youth, the jurisdiction has little of its own common law to apply.
Cases pertaining to Commonwealth law are brought in the CNMI Superior Court, a court
of general jurisdiction with five divisions.25 Appeals are directed toward the three-justice panel
that constitutes the CNMI Supreme Court.26 Appeals from this court to the U.S. Supreme Court
are extremely rare.27

II.
A.

APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY LAW

Land categorization under the CNMI Code
The categorization of land is important in determining which probate laws apply. Most of

this law is codified in the CNMI Code.

22

See Covenant, supra note 15, at § 505; see also U.S. Department of the Interior Secretarial Order 2989 at IV
Section 1 (Northern Mariana Islands laws in effect prior to the Covenant and not inconsistent with the Covenant or
other applicable U.S. laws shall remain in force).
23
See 8 N.M.I. Code § 2102; In re Estate of Manuel Aldan, No. 95-028, 5 N.M.I. 50, 1997 MP 3, 1997 WL
33480205 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13, 1997).
24
See 7 N.M.I. Code § 3401 (2004) (“For civil matters, the rules of the common law, as expressed in the
restatements of the law approved by the American Law Institute and, to the extent not so expressed as generally
understood and applied in the United States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Commonwealth, in the
absence of written law or local customary law to the contrary.”).
25
See 1 N.M.I. Code § 3203.
26
Pursuant to the Covenant at § 403, the Supreme Court was established on May 1, 1989. See 1 N.M.I. Code §
3101. Prior to the creation of the Supreme Court, the Covenant at § 402 vested in the U.S. District Court with
original federal jurisdiction as well as appellate jurisdiction over CNMI law matters.
27
The Covenant at § 403 provided that for 15 years following the creation of the Supreme Court, appeals from that
court would go to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, rather than to the U.S. Supreme Court.
As of May 1, 2004, CNMI Supreme Court appeals can be (but seldom are) taken directly to U.S. Supreme Court.

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 36

1.

Carolinian customary law

Under Carolinian customary law, property is held either in one's individual capacity or as
family land.28 The CNMI Code recognizes family land as land acquired “from one or more
Carolinian ancestors, and held by the person as customary trustee for the use of the family
members.”29 Family land is held by a customary trustee for the equal enjoyment of all
descendants of the original land owner.30 Estate of Ernesto Rangamar explains the concept of
family land:
Most Carolinians in the Northern Marianas descend from Carolinians “who
migrated ... from ... the Caroline chain.” With them they brought and were able to
maintain for a while “much of their old social organization, customs and
language.” Among these customs was “their traditional land tenure pattern.”
...
Traditional Carolinian land tenure is matrilineal, and land descends by the
minimeal [sic] lineage, i.e., mother to daughter. The land under this tenure system
is collectively owned and controlled by females.
...
Matrilineal land was held, pursuant to Carolinian land custom, collectively by the
females and recorded in the name of the oldest female member of the maternal
line, with the oldest holding title and acting more or less as a “trustee” for the rest
of the lineage members.31
Rangamar goes on to say that the system was somewhat distorted by the various systems for
registration of family land under the successive German, Japanese, and Trust Territory
administrations:
The German administration began a system of land registration, under which both
maternal lineage lands held collectively by females and lands received by
Carolinian males under a newly initiated homestead program were registered.32
Carolinian males received title to homestead land, which was recorded in their
individual name.
28

Estate of Ernesto Rangamar, No. 92-029, 4 N.M.I. 72, 76-77, 1993 WL 614806 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 1993).
8 N.M.I. Code § 2107(l) (stating that the acquisition can be “by law or decision of the family or by inheritance”).
30
8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2904(b), 2910.
31
Estate of Ernesto Rangamar, 4 N.M.I. at 76-77 (citations, footnotes and emphasis omitted).
32
The registration system did not usually record the names of the other female owners of the land. It was from this
registration system that the term “customary trustee” evolved. Id. at 77 n.14.
29
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...
The Carolinian males that received property under the homestead program held
the land individually. While some of these males gave their land to both female
and male heirs, others chose to give the land only to their daughter(s) who then
“subsequently founded a new matrilineal lineage.” Hence, the applicability of
Carolinian land custom to such lands became dependent upon the subsequent
treatment of the land by the female recipient(s) of the land.
...
The Japanese administration continued the German administration's system of
registering both land held individually and matrilineal land. Under the American
administration, however, Carolinian lands began to be registered in either the
name of an individual Carolinian or in the name of the heirs of a decedent with a
trustee designated, without regard to gender.33
For land held by an individual Carolinian, “[u]nless the family consents or agrees
otherwise,” the land becomes family land upon the individual’s death and passes to the oldest
surviving daughter as a customary trustee.34
Any alienation of Carolinian family land, erection of a permanent structure on the land,
or occupation of a permanent structure requires the consent of the family, which is determined by
majority vote of the customary trustee and his siblings.35 A court will presume land held by a
Carolinian to be family land unless the original owner showed clear intent to hold it otherwise.36
2.

Chamorro customary law

Like Carolinian custom, Chamorro custom distinguishes between individually owned
land and “ancestors’ land,”37 known as iyon manaina. The CNMI Code defines ancestors’ land
as “land acquired...from one or more of [the owner’s] Chamorro ancestors of Northern Marianas

33

Id. at 76-77 (citations, footnotes and emphasis omitted).
8 N.M.I. Code § 2905.
35
See 8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2904(c), 2907, 2909. This relationship applies “[u]nless the family consents or agrees
otherwise.” Id. at § 2909. For deceased siblings with descendants, the descendants may vote by representation. Id.
36
See In re Estate of Francisca Lairopi, No. 97-1234, 2002 MP 10, at ¶ 12, 6 N.M.I. 417, 2002 WL 32983565
(N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 16, 2002).
37
8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2902-2903; Estate of Mariana Deleon Guerrero, No. 87-295, 1 N.M.I. 301, 306, 1990 WL
291871 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 20, 1990) (applying pre-code intestacy law under Chamorro custom).
34
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descent.”38 As discussed below, the only significance of this distinction is that the spouse of the
decedent receives a life estate in the decedent’s ancestors’ land rather than the one-half share
received for other property.39
3.

Article XII

Article XII of the Constitution is one peculiar aspect of CNMI land law that has nothing
to do with customary law, but does relate to culture. Article XII limits permanent and long-term
(more than 55 years40) land acquisition to people who are at least one-quarter Northern Marianas
descent and corporations that are 100 percent Northern Marianas owned.41 The expressed policy
goals for this restriction are to (1) protect Northern Marianas persons from exploitation, (2)
promote economic advancement and self-sufficiency, and (3) recognize the importance of
ownership of land for the culture and traditions of the people of the CNMI.42 As Professor
Marybeth Herald points out, the law and the Ninth Circuit Court decision upholding the law43
assume the following: (1) there is no threat of exploitation or cultural dislocation when Northern
Marianas persons sell their land to ambitious or unscrupulous persons who happen to be of the

38

8 N.M.I. Code § 2107(a).
8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2902-2903.
40
The Second Constitutional Convention Amendment 35 (1985) extended the original provision (ratified 1977,
effective 1978) from 40 years to 55 years.
41
See N.M.I. Const. art. XII, § 3: “The term permanent and long-term interests in real property . . . includes freehold
interests and leasehold interests of more than fifty-five years including renewal rights, except an interest acquired
above the first floor of a condominium building.” A person is of Northern Marianas descent if “a citizen or national
of the United States and ... at least one-quarter Northern Marianas Chamorro or Northern Marianas Carolinian blood
or a combination thereof” or if adopted before the age of eighteen by a person of Northern Marianas descent. Id. at
§ 4. For determining descent, the constitution considers a person “to be a full-blooded Northern Marianas Chamorro
or Northern Marianas Carolinian if ... born or domiciled in the Northern Mariana Islands by 1950 and ... a citizen of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands before [November 3, 1986].” Id. A corporation is eligible to own land
only if “it is incorporated in the Commonwealth, has its principal place of business in the Commonwealth, has
directors one-hundred percent of whom are persons of Northern Marianas descent and has voting shares . . . onehundred percent of which are actually owned by persons of Northern Marianas descent.” Id. at § 5. Article XII' s
alienation restrictions “are not subject to equal protection analysis” under the U.S. Constitution. Wabol v.
Villacrusis, 958 F.2d 1450, 1463 (9th Cir. 1992).
42
Covenant, supra note 15, at § 805; Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1461.
43
See Wabol, 958 F.2d 1450.
39
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correct Northern Marianas ancestry; (2) all outsider land purchasers constitute a threat; (3) and
the 55-year alienations do not constitute a threat. 44 The policy also appears to assume that more
subtle forces (i.e., the adoption of modern American comforts and values) will not distort the
culture and traditions.45
Although Article XII does not concern customary law, it does come into play in cases in
which the application of statutory or customary law (such as passing land to one’s children)
would violate Article XII.46 More often, however, Article XII works with customary law, as it
reduces the opportunities for Northern Marianas persons to sell their family land. From the
perspective of the courts, Article XII adds another factor to consider when discerning whether
statutory, common, or customary law should be applied.47

44

Marybeth Herald, Does the Constitution Follow the Flag into the United States Territories or Can it Be
Separately Purchased and Sold?, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 707, 744-745 (1995).
45
There are no restrictions on adopting casino gambling or allowing foreign owned and staffed hotels, topless bars,
and garment factories (all of which rely on the CNMI’s massive pool of cheap immigrant labor)—actions that
intrude on the culture and change it. See Marybeth Herald, The Northern Mariana Islands: A Change in Course
Under Its Covenant with the United States, 71 OR. L. REV. 127, 186-87 (1992).
46
E.g., Estate of Edives Imamura, No. 89-1009, 5 N.M.I. 60, 1997 MP 7, 1997 WL 33480209 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May
1, 1997) (holding the Superior Court did not err in concluding that non-Northern Marianas grandchildren did not
acquire any interest in their grandmother’s estate through inheritance). As the number of inter-marriages increase
between Northern Marianas persons (as defined in the CNMI Constitution) and non-Northern Marianas, the Article
XII restriction will result in more conflicts with customary law on inheritance.
47
In Estate of Tudela, the CNMI Superior Court held that (1) section 2411 of the CNMI code (providing for a
“person not of Northern Marianas descent” can receive by devise or descent “the maximum allowable legal interest
in … real property” with any remaining interest passing to the next closest heirs or devisees eligible to own land in
the CNMI) was an improper legislative attempt to transform an unconstitutional acquisition of a long-term interest
in land by a non-NMI descent person; (2) the application of section 2601 (giving a surviving spouse has rights to
exempt property of the decedent's estate) to non-NMI surviving spouses unconstitutional, as it would improperly
allow the transfer of a family home to a person of non-NMI descent, in violation of Article XII (where there are
children of the decedent); and (3) section 2902 is unconstitutional in its application to a non-NMI spouse, as it
allows the spouse of a decedent to obtain a life estate in ancestral land with the children taking a vested remainder in
fee simple, contrary to Article XII. No. 86-884, slip op. 12-13, 1992 WL 397525 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 22, 1992).
The court thus declined to apply the statutory law. The CNMI Supreme Court overruled this decision on other
grounds and did not consider the constitutional issue. See 4 N.M.I. 1, 1993 WL 307683 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 16,
1993).
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B.

Discerning the law of intestate succession
At the turn of the 21st century, very few of the probate cases handled by the Superior

Court concern testate successions. It is not uncommon for an intestate succession to take place
decades after the decedent’s death.48 Sometimes the only impetus for probating an estate is the
government’s exercise of eminent domain and the resulting need to determine which heirs should
be awarded the proceeds of the forced sale.49 In these delayed probate cases, the estate’s only
asset is land or proceeds from the sale of land.
The CNMI Code is the starting point for determining the law on intestate succession,
although case law contains numerous examples of departures based on family agreements and
uncodified customs presented to courts by expert witnesses.50 Under the CNMI Code, intestate
succession varies depending on whether the decedent was Chamorro, Carolinian, or neither.51
1.

Chamorro customary law

Under Chamorro custom, a life estate in ancestors' land passes to the surviving spouse
with priority of succession for the remainder to descendants and then to siblings and their
descendants.52 If the decedent does not have a surviving spouse (which is usually the case in old
estate cases), then priority of succession for ancestors' land is to descendants and then to siblings

48

See, e.g., Estate of Lorenzo Rofag, No. 89-019, 2 N.M.I. 18, 1991 WL 70067 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 1991)
(finding the decedent died in 1944; probate initiated in 1989); In re Estate of Joaquin Dela Cruz, No. 90-023, 2
N.M.I. 1, 1991 WL 70072 (Sup. Ct. N.M.I. Feb. 7, 1991) (finding the decedent died in 1948; probate initiated in
1987).
49
See, e.g., Estate of Angel Malite, No. 97-369 (finding decedent died in early 20th century, probate filed for third
time in 1997); In re Estate of Vicenta Kaipat, No. 04-0090 (finding decedent died in early 20th century, probate filed
in 2004). The Superior Court does not have a record of either death.
50
See infra Section III(C).
51
A separate statutory regime which has nothing to do with custom exists for decedents not of Northern Marianas
Chamorro or Carolinian descent. See 8 N.M.I. Code § 2912. What happens when families are of mixed decent is
unclear. Usually heir-claimants assert that they have practiced a particular culture’s customs and would like to
proceed under that culture’s customary law. E.g., Sullivan v. Tarope, No. 98-1293, 2006 WL 1109449 (N.M.I. Sup.
Ct. Apr. 18, 2006).
52
See 8 N.M.I. Code § 2902(a), (c). Succession to heirs is “per stirpes.” Id. at § 2915.
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and their descendants.53 For all other property under Chamorro custom (i.e., personal property
and individually acquired real estate), one half passes to the surviving spouse and one half passes
to the descendants.54 If the decedent does not have a surviving spouse, then all such property
passes in priority of succession to descendants, to parents, and then to siblings and their
descendants.55
An important Chamorro tradition that is not codified is the succession of the family
home.56 Traditionally, the surviving spouse gets a life estate in the house, with the remainder
going to the child who has cared for and lived the longest with the parents.57
2.

Carolinian customary law

Under Carolinian custom, intestate succession depends upon whether property is family
land, other real property, or personal property, but the statutory intestate succession scheme is
subject to change upon family agreement.58 For family land in which the decedent was the
customary trustee, another family member will become the customary trustee and the land will
retain its nature as family land “[u]nless the family consents or agrees otherwise.”59 As the above

53

8 N.M.I. Code § 2902(b), (d).
8 N.M.I. Code § 2903.
55
Id.
56
A surviving spouse has rights to exempt property of the decedent's estate consisting of “the primary family home
and lot, household furniture, one automobile, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects.” 8 N.M.I. Code § 2601.
57
See SPOEHR, supra note 7, at 143; see also Diaz v. Taylor, No. 97-0879 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1997), slip
op. at 5 ( “The daughter or son who stays with the parents and cares for them receives the family home as a reward
in most instances.”). The home may also be transferred before death by a revocable oral conveyance. Discussed
infra Section II(E). See Diaz, slip op. at 5; Estate of Antonia Iglecias, No. 05-0142 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 12,
2005).
58
These rules are flexible. All sections in the Commonwealth Code concerning Carolinian probate custom contain
the phrase: “[u]nless the family consents or agrees otherwise.” 8 N.M.I. Code §§ 2904-11.
59
8 N.M.I. Code § 2904 (a). Priority of succession to customary trustee is to the oldest surviving sister, to the oldest
surviving brother, to the oldest surviving daughter of decedent and his siblings, to the oldest surviving son of
decedent and his siblings, to the decedent's oldest surviving granddaughter, and finally to the decedent's oldest
surviving grandson. Id. If none of these are available, the family (or the court) chooses a customary trustee. Id. at §
2904(a)(6).
54
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quoted portion of the statutory code suggests, family agreement can and often does override the
code.
Integral in family agreements on intestate succession is the role of the customary trustee
and possibly that of a figure described in some cases as the telap (chief). In Estate of Isaac
Kaipat, an expert witness on Carolinian culture testified that, while the oldest female acts as a
trustee for the family property, it is the oldest son of the oldest female who acts as the telap and
spokesperson for the family.60 Carolinian culture requires the telap to work with the trustee and
other heirs in making decisions.61 In Estate of Remedio Malite, however, a different expert
witness referred to the female trustee of family land as the telap.62
The power of the statutory code is also limited by the idea that it can be disproved by
custom. In Willbanks v. Stein, after deciding that Chamorro custom applied, the Superior Court
described a particular statute providing for inheritance of an illegitimate child63 as the “best
evidence of applicable Chamorro custom.”64 The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, holding that
this section of the CNMI Code sets forth a standard of proof rather than evidence of custom.65
The Supreme Court stated, “[w]hile the probate code may reflect certain aspects of custom, it
does not, standing alone, establish custom as a matter of law.”66 The Supreme Court instructed
the trial court to take further evidence, if warranted, on the issue of custom.67

60

No. 05-0247, slip op. at 4 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following Evidentiary Hearing and Denying
Heirship Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen). It is possible for a person to assume the role as
telap even if he is not the oldest male, provided that this is the decision of the family. Id.
61
Id.
62
No. 06-0163, slip op. at 11 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 25, 2006) (Order Confirming the Mwei Mwei Adoption of
Jesus Somol and Recognizing the Estate of Jesus Somol as an Heir to the Estate of Remedio Malite).
63
8 N.M.I. Code § 2918(b)(2).
64
No. 91-0337, slip op. at 3 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. July 19, 1993).
65
Willbanks v. Stein, No. 91-0337, 4 N.M.I. 205, 206, 1994 WL 1886694 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 6, 1994).
66
Id.
67
Id.
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Thus, the CNMI Code often serves as the baseline for determining intestate succession,
rather than a set of bright-line rules. Where the rules are altered, courts must go through the
difficult process of determining who is the customary trustee (under Carolinian custom), who
said what (often many years ago), which expert has the best knowledge of customary law, and
whether the family has actually followed customary law.

C.

Conflicting laws and customs regarding marital property
The Commonwealth Marital Property Act of 1990,68 based on the Uniform Marital

Property Act,69 established a community property regime in terms of “marital property” and
“individual property.”70 Under the Act, the surviving spouse retains a one-half undivided interest
in marital property, subject to the Article XII alienation restrictions.71 While this rule seems
fairly clear, 21st century courts often deal with cases in which a decedent died prior to the
application of the 1990 law.72 A brief review of the case law for these estates demonstrates the
confusion created by conflicting customs and the application of traditional and modern common
law.
In Matagolai v. Pangelinan, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands
sitting as an appeals court rejected the application of community property principles in the CNMI
in the absence of legislation explicitly providing for them.73 Noting that community property is a
68

8 N.M.I. Code §§ 1811-1834.
See Reyes v. Reyes, No. 97-0167, 2004 MP 1, ¶ 27, 2004 WL 3704880 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2004.);
8 N.M.I. Code § 1811 cmt.
70
Estate of Manuel Aldan, No. 95-028, 5 N.M.I. 50, 52, 1997 MP 3, ¶ 16, 1997 WL 33480205 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb.
13, 1997).
71
8 N.M.I. Code § 1820(c). In general, marital property is property acquired by either spouse during the marriage
except for property received by gift, devise, or descent to one spouse alone or for property traceable to one spouse's
individual property. See id. at § 1820.
72
P.L. 7-22, effective February 22, 1991, is not retroactive.
73
3 CR 591, 597 (D. N. Mar. I. App. Div. 1988).
69
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product of civil law rather than common law, the court applied the Anglo-American common
law vesting all ownership in the husband.74
In Estate of Mariana Deleon Guerrero,75 the CNMI Supreme Court upheld the Superior
Court’s ruling76 that property purchased during the marriage and listed only the husband's name,
belonged to the husband alone. Relying on Spoehr’s treatise,77 the court found that Chamorro
custom provided for ownership of all of the wife’s property to vest in her husband upon the
wife’s death.78
In Ada v. Sablan, the CNMI Supreme Court (also relying on Spoehr’s treatise79)
considered a different Chamorro custom known as patte pareho to find that both spouses had an
equal ownership interest in property acquired during marriage.80 The Supreme Court also relied
on the CNMI Constitution’s equal protection clause.81 This finding overruled the Superior
Court’s common law based finding that all property acquired during marriage belonged to the
husband separately.82
In Estate of Manuel Aldan, a case brought after the Marital Property Act but concerning a
death during the Trust Territory era, the Superior Court decided that “Deleon Guerrero must be
read in the light of the prohibition against sex discrimination embodied in Article I, § 6 of the
Commonwealth Constitution.”83 The Superior Court reasoned that since in Deleon Guerrero all
property vested in the husband when the wife died, it is only fair that all property vested in the
74

Id.
No. 87-295, 1 N.M.I. 302, 1990 WL 291871 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 20, 1990).
76
Estate of Mariana Deleon Guerrero, No. 87-295 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 1989).
77
See Spoehr, supra note 7, at 140.
78
Estate of Mariana Deleon Guerrero, 1 N.M.I. at 306.
79
See Spoehr, supra note 7, at 135-136.
80
No. 89-419, 1 N.M.I. 415, 423-24, 1990 WL 291959 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 1990).
81
Id. at 424 (citing N.M.I. Const. art. I, § 6).
82
Id.
83
No. 90-0490, slip op. at 3 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Aug. 8, 1995).
75
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wife when the husband died.84 The court concluded that not to do so would result in sex
discrimination against the wife, in violation of the CNMI Constitution.85
The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, finding that when the husband died, his property did
not vest in his wife; it vested in his children (including illegitimate children not born to his
wife).86 The court drew from Palacios v. Coleman,87 which held that when the property descends
to the children, there is a corresponding custom which requires the children to support their
widowed mother during her lifetime.88 The court found that the wife benefitted from the
Chamorro custom in which her children provided for her needs for the remainder of her life.89
These cases suggest two competing versions of Chamorro customary law—one version
allows a husband to take all of the wife’s land, while patte pareho90 provides for community
property. Added to the confusion is the relevance of the CNMI’s equal protection clause, which
was relevant to the Ada Supreme Court and the Aldan Superior Court, but not to the Aldan
Supreme Court and the Ada Superior Court. Thus, although the Marital Property Act appears to
establish a community property regime, there are no clear rules to apply to many estates which
remain to be probated.
As of this writing, the Superior Court is currently considering another variant on
Chamorro customary law with respect to rights accruing from marriage: gumagachong, the
Chamorro customary equivalent of common law marriage. The court must decide whether
84

Id.
Id.
86
Estate of Manuel Aldan, No. 90-0490, 5 N.M.I. 50, 1997 MP 3, 1997 WL 33480205 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 13,
1997).
87
1 CR 34, 36 (D.N.M.I. 1980)
88
Estate of Manuel Aldan, 1997 MP 3, at ¶ 11.
89
Id. at ¶ 16.
90
To date, only one other CNMI court has referred to patte pareho. See Reyes v. Reyes, No. 97-0167, 2004 MP 1, ¶
27, 2004 WL 3704880 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2004) (suggesting that the Marital Property Act of 1990 codified the
doctrine of patte pareho).
85
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custom requires that the family members of a deceased gumagachong partner provide some
share of the estate to the surviving partner.91 As the Marital Property Act neither recognizes nor
prohibits gumagachong,92 the outcome of this case may result in another example of “judicial
codification” of customary law that will impact future rights.

D.

The uncertain effect of customary adoption on inheritance
Intestate succession treats illegitimate children and “adopted” children as legitimate,

natural children.93 The question of what constitutes “adoption” frequently arises in cases
attempting to determine adoption for purposes of inheritance. Both the Carolinians and the
Chamorros practice a form of customary adoption that may or may not grant full inheritance
rights.
1.

Carolinian customary law

The Carolinian practice of mwei-mwei is typically viewed as a valid adoption for
inheritance purposes,94 although a Carolinian family can agree to treat an adopted child as not
belonging to the family for purposes of family land rights and intestate succession.95
Mwei-mwei occurs when a single adult or a married couple chooses to raise a child as if it
were the natural child of the adopting party with the consent of the natural parent or parents.96

91

See Estate of Charles Reyes, No. 06-0554 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. ____).
The CNMI legislature has nevertheless recognized that there is a “customary marriage” in the CNMI for certain
purposes. See 6 N.M.I. Code § 103(t) (defining spouse to include “the husband of wife of a customary marriage” for
purposes of criminal law, thereby allowing customary marriage to serve as a defense to a charge of rape (see 6
N.M.I. Code § 1302)).
93
8 N.M.I. Code § 2918.
94
See Estate of Lorenzo Rofag, No. 89-019, 2 N.M.I. 18, 31-32, 1991 WL 70067 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 22, 1991)
(affirming heredity through mwei-mwei); but see Estate of Remedio Malite, No. 06-0163 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 25,
2006) (Order Confirming the Mwei Mwei Adoption of Jesus Somol and Recognizing the Estate of Jesus Somol as
an Heir to the Estate of Remedio Malite) (referring to the practice of fa’am, in which the customarily adopted child
is treated more like a foster child, and the adoption ends when the child turns 18).
95
8 N.M.I. Code § 2908.
92
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The child is usually taken in as a baby and is usually a relative of the adopting party.97 Mweimwei is not terminated unless the mwei-mwei parent(s) die when the child is still young.98
2.

Chamorro customary law

The Chamorro custom of poksai is more ambiguous. In Estate of Andres Macaranas, the
Superior Court held that there was insufficient expert testimony to prove that the Chamorro
custom of poksai was intended to serve as a customary adoption as envisioned by the Probate
Code.99 The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the concept of having to provide expert
testimony to determine the cultural connotations of poksai.100
The CNMI Supreme Court did not discuss situations in which families take in a child for
a temporary period, after which the child returns to its original family. However, the term poksai
also applies to this situation.101
The Macaranas Supreme Court ruling was distinguished by Estate of Antonia Iglecias, in
which the claimant Velma Iglecias produced substantial evidence regarding her status as a
pineaksi (adopted child) of her grandparents.102 This included decisions the grandparents had
made regarding Velma’s education, residence, and discipline, as well as Velma’s receipt of her
grandparents’ social security benefits.103 The court rejected Velma’s reliance on the Macaranas
Supreme Court ruling to claim inheritance rights. The court found that Velma’s claim was
barred by her failure to produce evidence that Chamorro custom grants pineaksi the full
96

Estate of Aguida Amires, No. 95-012, 5 N.M.I. 70, 73, 1997 MP 8, 1997 WL 33480210 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 12,
1997).
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
No. 01-0136, slip op. at 7 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 2002).
100
See Estate of Macaranas, 2003 MP 11, ¶¶ 13, 16, 17, 6 N.M.I. 571, 2003 WL 24267661(N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 23,
2003) (summarizing supreme court law concerning poksai).
101
Interview with Judge Juan T. Lizama, Superior Court of Saipan, CNMI (Dec. 3, 2005).
102
No. 05-0142 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 2005).
103
Id., slip op. at 2-4.
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inheritance rights of a customarily adopted or a natural child.104 Although this finding seems to
mirror the Macaranas Superior Court’s overturned finding, it was not appealed. The right of
pineaksi to inherit from their adopting parents will remain unclear until the CNMI legislature
codifies this right.
3.

Double inheritance?

In Estate of Isaac Kaipat, the CNMI Superior Court stated, “[o]ne’s status as an adopted
child should not automatically entitle him or her to inherit from the estates of both the natural
and adoptive parents. Evidence of an intent of the parents to bestow inheritance rights, and/or
customary law, are needed to determine the distribution of property.”105 A subsequent ruling in
the same case found that a child who had already inherited from his adopted parent was not
entitled to inherit from his natural parent when the natural and adopted parents were brother and
sister, because inheriting from both would amount to a double share in the family’s assets.106 As
discussed infra, this decision did not result from the application of customary law, which proved
inconclusive on this issue. Courts will likely confront this issue again, as there are many
situations in which children are customarily adopted by close relatives (e.g., grandparents).

E.

Relaxations on the evidentiary and procedural rules
1.

The partida and oral conveyances

By accounting for custom, the CNMI Code and jurisprudence soften the U.S. federal
evidentiary rules upon which the Commonwealth Rules of Evidence are based. One of the most
104

Id., slip op. at 8.
No. 05-0247, slip op. at 10 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 8, 2006) (Order Governing the Heirship Claims of the Heirs
of Dolores K. Pelisamen and Jay Sorensen).
106
No. 05-0247, slip op. at 5-6 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following Evidentiary Hearing and
Denying Heirship Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen).
105
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frequent derivations from the American rules of evidence, the partida, is based on customary
Chamorro law. A “partida” is a Chamorro custom that occurs when a father calls his family
together and outlines the division of property among his children.107 Courts consider partida on a
case-by-case basis, because the means by which a partida is accomplished are flexible and the
intent of the decedent must be effectuated where discerned.108 Since the 1983 enactment of the
Statute of Frauds, the partida is the only form of oral conveyance permitted in the CNMI.109
Traditional oral wills may still be applicable for cases in which the decedent died prior to the
enactment of the Statute of Frauds.110
A testamento is a written memorialization of a partida that “preserves in writing the
intent and directions of the male head of the family in regards to distribution of the family's
property.”111 Depending upon the circumstances of the case, it may be the sole evidence of a
conveyance.112 The testamento need not meet the common law or CNMI Code evidentiary
requirements for a will.113
107

Estate of Antonio Barcinas, No. 89-850, 4 N.M.I. 149, 152 n.4, 1994 WL 413255 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 26,
1994). No cases have recognized situations in which a mother performed a partida, although this situation is
currently before the Superior Court in Estate of Trinidad Duenas, No. 05-0266 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. _____).
108
Estate of Pedro Deleon Castro, No. 92-147, 4 N.M.I. 102,110, 1994 WL 111299 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. March 8,
1994) (internal citations omitted); see also Estate of Jose Cabrera, No. 88-582, 2 N.M.I. 195, 207-208, 1991 WL
258342 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 31, 1991) (court found partida where father did not call family meeting but gave
properties successively upon his children’s marriages).
109
The NMI Statute of Frauds explicitly provides for the partida. See 2 N.M.I. Code § 4916 (“[t]his article shall not
apply to a partida performed pursuant to custom of the Northern Mariana Islands”).
110
See Guerrero v. Guerrero, No. 89-569, 2 N.M.I. 61, 70-71, 1991 WL 70062 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1991)
(allowing testimony regarding an oral inter vivos conveyance of property occurring prior to 1983); Estate of
Antonio Barcinas, No. 89-850, 2 N.M.I. 437, 444, 1992 WL 62776 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 1992) (“Historically,
under local customary law no writing was necessary to devise property.”).
111
Estate of Torres, 1 CR 237, 244 (Dist. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
112
See, e.g., id. at 239, 244-46 (absent other evidence of partida court views testamento as customary will).
Testamento may also serve as a written confirmation of an oral partida). Cf. Estate of Juan Camacho, No. 87-638, 4
N.M.I. 22, 23, 1994 WL 614815 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July 30, 1993) (conveyance by Chamorro custom confirmed by
document entitled Ultimo na Testamento).
113
See Estate of Pedro Deleon Castro, No. 92-147, 4 N.M.I. 102, 1994 WL 111299 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. March 8,
1994). The Superior Court admitted an unauthenticated and unwitnessed document executed by the decedent, which
outlined a distribution of his land among his relatives, and which (according to testimony) decedent showed and
read to his wife and two of his sons. The CNMI Supreme Court found that the Superior Court did not err in
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2.

Hearsay exceptions

Like its federal counterpart, the CNMI Rules of Evidence contain exceptions to the
prohibition on hearsay evidence based on history and reputation. However, unlike many U.S.
cases, this sort of hearsay evidence is often the cornerstone of disputes concerning probate, land,
and customary adoptions. Given the delayed processing of estate successions, hearsay evidence
may be the only evidence available in the case.114
Commonwealth Rule of Evidence 803(20) permits the admission of hearsay statements
relating to “[r]eputation in a community, arising before the controversy, as to boundaries of or
customs affecting lands in the community, and reputation as to events of general history
important to the community or State or nation in which located.”115 This has been interpreted to
allow the admission of hearsay evidence as to who owned a disputed parcel of land.116
Rule 803(19) is another frequently relied on exception to the rule that precludes
admission of hearsay evidence, and permits admission of hearsay testimony regarding
“[r]eputation among members of a person's family by blood, adoption, or marriage, or among a
person's associates, or in the community, concerning a person's birth, adoption, marriage,
divorce, death, legitimacy, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, ancestry, or other
similar fact of personal or family history.”117 Rule 804(b)(4) is a similar exception permitting
hearsay evidence concerning personal or family history when the declarant is unavailable.118
Rule 803(13) allows for admission of hearsay “concerning personal or family history contained
determining that the document was a testament even though two of the distributees were not present when it was
read.
114
See Estate of Felipe Seman, No. 91-918, 4 N.M.I. 129, 133, 1994 WL 413208 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 24 1994).
115
COM. R. EVID. 803(20). The U.S. counterpart is identical. See FED. R. EVID. 803(20).
116
See Guerrero v. Guerrero, No. 89-569, 2 N.M.I. 61, 70-71, 1991 WL 70062 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1991).
117
COM. R. EVID. 803(19); see Arriola v. Arriola, No. 97-049, 6 N.M.I. 1, 1999 MP 13, 1999 WL 33992427
(N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999). The U.S. counterpart is identical. See FED. R. EVID. 803(19).
118
COM. R. EVID. 804(b). The U.S. counterpart is identical. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b); see also Estate of Antonio
Barcinas, No. 89-850, 2 N.M.I. 437 n.4, WL 62776 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 1992).
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in family Bibles, genealogies, charts, engravings on rings, inscriptions on family portraits,
engravings on urns, crypts, or tombstones, or the like.”119
In Estate of Remedio Malite, the Superior Court actually declined to rely on written
evidence regarding an alleged customary adoption, finding that documents containing admissible
hearsay were not probative in this matter.120 The court stated, “[f]irst of all, the essence of mweimwei is an oral agreement, without the written formalities familiar to statutory adoptions.
Second, the documents presented to the Court are fraught with many of the same conflicts as
those raised by the testimonies of the witnesses.”121
3.

Affidavits

Two CNMI Supreme Court cases suggest that affidavits with references to Carolinian or
Chamorro customary law (i.e., the partida) may not be held to the strict evidentiary requirements
of other affidavits.
In Sullivan v. Tarope, the plaintiff argued that the defendant’s conveyances of all of his
property to his three daughters, without valuable consideration, and without relinquishing
possession and control over the properties, after the entry of a California judgment, were
fraudulent.122 The defendant argued that he gave his land by partida. To support his claims that a

119

COM. R. EVID. 803(3). The U.S. counterpart is identical. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3). The court in Guerrero v.
Guerrero, No. 89-569, 2 N.M.I. 61, 69, 1991 WL 70062 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1991) explained the different
applications of these rules: “Both Com. R. Evid. 803(13) and (19) allow hearsay testimony to be introduced if
personal or family history is involved. Com. R. Evid. 803(20) allows hearsay testimony if boundaries of or customs
affecting lands is involved. Com. R. Evid. 803(13) additionally requires the existence of certain specified family
records. Com. R. Evid. 803(19) requires the additional factor of a reputation 1) among family members, 2) among
associates, or 3) in the community. Com. R. Evid. 803(20) requires also that the testimony be reputation in the
community.”
120
No. 06-0163, slip op. at 2 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 25, 2006) (Order Confirming the Mwei Mwei Adoption of
Jesus Somol and Recognizing the Estate of Jesus Somol as an Heir to the Estate of Remedio Malite).
121
Id.
122
No. 98-1293, 2006 MP 11, ¶ 19, 2006 WL 1109449 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 2006).
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partida occurred, the defendant provided the Superior Court with affidavits regarding the alleged
partida.
One daughter’s affidavit stated in pertinent part that,
… My father gave me Tract Number 22886. … My father before [sic] giving me
the deed of gift performed a partida. … The land given to me will be under my
care under Carolinian custom. … As the oldest daughter of Jose T. Tarope, I will
be culturally responsible for my younger sisters upon the death of my father.123
The defendant’s affidavit stated,
… I am of both Chamorro and Carolinian descent. … I practice both Carolinian
and Chamorro customs. … In 1995, I suffered a heart attack. … Due to my ailing
health in 1995, I performed the Chamorro custom of partida. … I memorialized
the oral partida by deeds of gift which are now in question. … I gave the land to
my daughters in conformity with the Carolinian custom of matrilineal inheritance.
… The land was given to my children based on Chamorro custom.124
The Superior Court struck these affidavits as being too conclusive and containing no
factual support for the claim that the transfers were made by a partida, such as the time, place, or
members present when the ‘partida’ was made.”125
The CNMI Supreme Court reversed, finding that when viewed in a light most favorable
to the defendant, the affidavits suggested that there was a partida.126 The CNMI Supreme Court
drew on Cabrera v. Heirs of De Castro,127 in which the trial court similarly found that an
affidavit submitted into evidence did not rise to the level of setting forth sufficient indicia of a
partida.128 The Cabrera Supreme Court reversed, finding that although the affidavit did not state

123

Id. at ¶ 45 n.4.
Id. at ¶ 45 n.5.
125
Sullivan v. Tarope, No. 98-1293, slip. op. at 7 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 2003) (Order Granting Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment); see COM. R. CIV. P 56(e) (“Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.”).
126
Sullivan v., Tarope, No. 98-1293, ¶ 48, 2006 WL 1109449 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 2006).
127
No. 88-359, 1 N.M.I. 172, 1990 WL 291857 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 7, 1990).
128
Cabrera v. Heirs of De Castro, No. 88-359 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 9, 1989) (Order Granting Summary
Judgment).
124
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the time, place, or members present when the partida was made, the declarations made in the
affidavit should be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party, i.e., that there was a
partida.129
4.

Property title documents

CNMI courts need not find that property title documents are conclusive, and may rely on
testimony to controvert title. This is because of a presumption that any land in which title is
vested in the female head of a Carolinian family is Carolinian family land belonging to the entire
family rather than the title holder.130
In Estate of Rita Kaipat, the Superior Court relied on a title document rather than
Carolinian custom in determining that an heir of the decedent was the individual owner of the
property.131 On appeal, the CNMI Supreme Court held that failure to look behind the documents
to determine how one heir acquired the land was an error.132 The Superior Court was thus
required to determine whether the individual heir held title for herself or on behalf of the clan.133
A similar case, Estate of Francisca Lairopi, concerned a dispute (in the year 2002)
regarding title to property of an ancestor who had died before World War II.134 Members of the
extended family who were not direct heirs of the ancestor claimed that the land was Carolinian
family land belonging to all of them, rather than to the heirs of the ancestor’s daughter as the title
to the property indicated. The CNMI Supreme Court agreed with the Superior Court’s finding

129

1 N.M.I. at 177. (“While we agree that the affidavit of a party opposing a motion for summary judgment cannot
state conclusive statements . . . the affidavit of Mrs. Elena Q. Sablan and the pleadings themselves do point to the
possible existence of a “partida.”).
130
See Estate of Francisca Lairopi, No. 97-1234, 6 N.M.I. 417, 2002 MP 10, 2002 WL 32983565 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct.
May 16, 2002).
131
No. 90-840, slip op. at 4 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Sep. 24, 1991).
132
Estate of Rita Kaipat, No. 90-840, 3 N.M.I. 494, 498, 1993 WL 307672 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 1993).
133
Id.
134
No. 97-1234, 6 N.M.I. 417, 2002 MP 10, 2002 WL 32983565 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 16, 2002).
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that the title determinations were “customary titles” rather than actual titles, such that the
Superior Court “properly looked behind” the titles.135
By contrast, in Estates of Antonio Teregeyo, the Superior Court rejected the argument
that a title in a single person’s name was a “customary title” for the benefit of the Carolinian
family, because the title was in the name of a male instead of a family.136 The court found this
inconsistent with the Carolinian matrilineal tradition, and determined that the land in question
belonging exclusively to the owner rather than to the family as Carolinian family land.137 The
CNMI Supreme Court upheld this finding.138
Likewise, in Estate of Ernesto Rangamar, the CNMI Supreme Court found that the land
at issue was not family land because it was deeded as a homestead. 139 Thus, all of the heirs,
including the males, were entitled to an equal undivided interest.140
5.

Res judicata

Customary law has been used to soften the effect of res judicata and the doctrine of
applying the law of the case. For example, in Estate of Rita Kaipat, litigants presented evidence
of a 1991 evidentiary hearing in which a testifying witness failed to mention one Carmen Guelles
as a child of the decedent when naming the decedent’s children.141 The same witness testified at
a 2006 hearing that Carmen Guelles was an adopted child of the decedent.142

135

Id. at ¶ 19.
Nos. 91-0298, 91-0299, slip op. at 10-11 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Mar 14, 1995).
137
Id.
138
Estate of Antonio Teregeyo, No. 91-0298, 5 N.M.I. 90, 1997 MP 14, 1997 WL 33480216 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. July
25, 1997).
139
No. 92-029, 4 N.M.I. 72, 1993 WL 614806 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 1993).
140
Id. at 77. The court also noted that the leasing of part of the land for fifty-five years effectively removed a
substantial portion of the property from the family for use by the lineal heirs.
141
No. 90-0840, slip op. at 6 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Jan. 23, 2006) (Order Re Accounting, Claims of Surveyors Juan I.
Castro and Alfred K. Pangelinan, and Carmen Guelles’ Heirship Claim).
142
Id.
136
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Relying on a statutory expression that one of the purposes of the CMNI probate law is to
preserve the historic traditions and culture of the citizens of Northern Marianas descent, the
Superior Court took “judicial notice of Carolinian cultural morays.”143 The court found that part
of the Carolinian culture “is the designation of the eldest female member of the lineage as the
family’s spokesperson.”144 Since the witness in question was not the eldest daughter of Carmen
Guelles, the court found that it was “understandable that another family member would be
reluctant to speak for [the eldest daughter] in such a situation. [The eldest daughter] and her
siblings should not be punished for [the witness’s] failure to speak up on their behalf.”145 The
court thus relied on the witness’s statement at the 2006 hearing that Carmen Guelles was an
adopted child of the decedent, and based on this and other evidence, ruled that Carmen Guelles
was an heir to the decedent’s estate.146
The above cases suggest that, although the CNMI evidence and civil procedure rules are
almost carbon copies of the federal rules, they are applied so as to favor uncodified customary
law.

F.

Limitations on the jury trial—custom and culture in criminal law?
Customary law (or at least recognition of cultural morays) can also affect criminal law, in

particular, the right to a trial by jury.

143

Id., slip op. at 7 (citing 8 N.M.I. Code § 2104(b)(4)).
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
144
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Before 1965, there was no right to trial by jury in the Trust Territory.147 The right to a
jury trial in 21st century CNMI is limited to cases in which a defendant is threatened with a fine
of $2000 or a five-year jail sentence.148 The Ninth Circuit in Commonwealth v. Magofna
provides the expressed reasoning for this limitation: “the fear that the small, closely-knit
population in the Northern Mariana Islands might lead to acquittals of guilty persons in criminal
cases.”149 The Magofna court also commented on this closely-knit population: “[i]n such a small
community where so many languages are spoken, ensuring juror comprehension in all stages of
the proceedings may be a significant problem.”150
In CNMI v. Atalig, the Ninth Circuit explained why this jury trial limitation does not
violate the Sixth or Fourteenth Amendments: it is consistent with culture and custom.151 The
court referred to the so-called Insular Cases, which suggested that traditional Anglo-American
procedures such as jury trial might be inappropriate in territories having cultures, traditions and
institutions different from our own.152 The court suggested that Congress should have the
flexibility “to avoid imposition of the jury system on peoples unaccustomed to common law

147

In August of 1965, the First Congress of Micronesia enacted PL 1-7 establishing the right to a jury trial,
conditioned on local adoption by district legislatures. In 1966, the NMI District Legislature adopted the jury trial
provisions of the Trust Territory Code. See 7 N.M.I. Code § 3101 cmt. Section 501(1) of the Trust Territory Code
contained the same language as 7 N.M.I. Code § 3101.
148
See 7 N.M.I. Code § 3101(a) and former 5 TTC § 501(1); see also Covenant § 501(a) “(N)either trial by jury nor
indictment by grand jury shall be required in any civil action or criminal prosecution based on local law, except
where required by local law.” The CNMI Constitution, which took effect on the same day as the Covenant, states:
“The legislature may provide for trial by jury in criminal or civil cases.” N.M.I. Const. art. I, § 8.
149
919 F.2d 103, 106 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Report No. 4 of the Committee on Personal Rights and Natural
Resources (Oct. 29, 1976), reprinted in Vol. II, Journal of the Northern Mariana Islands Constitutional Convention
506 (1976)). This matter originally came before the Trust Territory trial court and was appealed to the appellate
division of the U.S. District Court for the CNMI. The defendant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
150
Id.
151
723 F.2d 682, 690 (9th Cir. 1984). This matter originally came before the CNMI trial court and was appealed to
the appellate division of the U.S. District Court for the CNMI. The defendant then appealed to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
152
Id., citing Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 310 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904).
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traditions”153 and to accommodate “the particular social and cultural conditions of areas such as
the NMI.”154
Thus, the limitation on the right to a jury trial—like the restriction of land alienation
under Article XII of the CNMI constitution—can be justified in the face of U.S. Constitutional
challenges by reference to the importance of respect for culture and tradition.

III.

FILLING IN THE GAPS

As the above-cited cases suggest, there are numerous gaps in the statutory code (as well
as in the concepts of customary law) that have been left for the courts to fill in. Aside from
relying on expert witnesses in customary law, CNMI courts have extrapolated law from the
Restatements or U.S. jurisprudence. At the turn of the 21st century, the Restatements have been a
source of guidance on the issues of third-party beneficiary contracts,155 estoppels based on the
acceptance of benefits,156 the applicability of arbitration,157 apparent agency,158 fraudulent
misrepresentation,159 as well as other issues.

A.

The application of the Restatements
Title 7 Section 3401 of the CNMI Code provides,
In all proceedings, the rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements
of the law approved by the American Law Institute and, to the event not so
expressed as generally understood and applied in the United States, shall be the

153

Id., citing Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 148 (1904); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 469, (1979).
Id.
155
Aplus Co., Ltd. v. Niizeki Intern. Saipan Co. Ltd., No. 99-0532, 2006 WL 1789125 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 22,
2006).
156
Sullivan v. Tarope, Nos. 98-1293, 2006 WL 1109449 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 2006).
157
PAC United Corp., Ltd. (CNMI) v. Guam Concrete Builders, No. 00-035, 6 N.M.I. 446, 2002 MP 15, 2002 WL
32983887 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Aug. 16, 2002).
158
Does I v. Gap, Inc., No. 01-0031, 2002 WL 1000068 (D. N. Mar. I. May 10, 2002).
159
Pangelinan v. Itaman, No. 93-012, 1994 WL 111281 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21, 1994).
154
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rules of decision in the courts of Commonwealth, in the absence of written law or
customary law to the contrary.
One CNMI court discussing this statute stated that it “provides for the almost wholesale
application of the rules of law, in the absence of written or customary law,” and characterized the
statute as a “shorthand attempt to fill a gap due to the absence of statutory laws in many
areas.”160

B.

Majority views in American case law
Although the Restatements are the courts’ first source of common law, courts may look

elsewhere when the Restatements do not provide a clear solution,161 or where they appear
outdated or inconsistent with CNMI law. For example, in Villanueva v. City Trust Bank, the
court declined to apply the Restatement view on the right of possession under mortgage law,
finding that a lien theory was more fitting than a title theory.162 In Manglona v. Commonwealth,
the CNMI Supreme Court chose to apply the majority view (as opposed to the Restatement)
treating a lease as a contract with respect to a landlord’s duty to mitigate damages.163

160

Borja v. Goodman, No. 88-394, 1 N.M.I. 225, 238 n.4, 1990 WL 291854 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. June 26, 1990).
Nevertheless, customary law, where it can be discerned, should take priority over common law. Estate of Lorenzo
Rofag, No. 89-019, 2 N.M.I. 18, 32 n.7, 1991 WL 70067 (Sup. Ct. N.M.I. Feb. 22, 1991) (“7 CMC § 3401 generally
upholds customary law by giving it priority over common law.”).
161
Del Rosario v. Camacho 5 N.M.I. 183, 2001 MP 3, ¶89 n.9, 2001 WL 34883245 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2001)
(“It is well established that the Commonwealth may look to the law of other United States jurisdictions where the
Commonwealth's written law, local customary law, and the Restatements do not provide guidance.”); Weathersbee
v. Weathersbee, No. 95-0793, 1998 MP 14, ¶ 6, 5 N.M.I 183, 1998 WL 34073644 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Nov. 17, 1998)
(applying the majority view prohibiting retroactive modification of a spousal support decree).
162
No. 2000-13, 6 N.M.I. 346, 2002 MP 01, 2006 WL 335860 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2006); see also Ada v.
Sablan, No. 89-419, 1 N.M.I. 415, 425-29, 1990 WL 291959 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Nov. 16, 1990) (holding that a marital
property regime exists in CNMI because as to property of a marriage, the common law, which is largely inapplicable
in the several states, has principles contrary to the commonwealth constitution).
163
No. 04-012, 2005 MP 15, ¶ 34, 2005 WL 3771373 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. 2005 MP 15 Oct. 4, 2005) (“In many
jurisdictions, leases have come to be viewed as more properly analyzed under contract law rather than property
law.”) (citing Teodori v. Werner, 415 A.2d 31, 33-34 (Pa. 1980); Wesson v. Leone Enter., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 611,
619-20 (Ma. 2002)).

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 59

C.

When application of common law takes priority over customary law
In Estate of Antonio Barcinas, the CNMI Supreme Court considered the estate of an

individual who had died during the time of the Trust Territory with eight children.164 The dispute
concerned whether land given during the lifetime of the decedent to three of the children
precluded them from the distribution of estate land. Because the decedent died before 1984, the
court determined that the Probate Code did not apply to the probate of his estate.165 However, the
applicable Trust Territory Code did not provide for intestate succession. The court failed to cite
another portion of the Trust Territory Code, which mandated that the customs of the Trust
Territory inhabitants were to have full force and effect of law if there is no conflict with other
laws.166 In considering whether to apply Chamorro custom, the court noted that Chamorro
custom contained nothing akin to the common law concept of advancements.167 Instead of
relying on Chamorro custom to invalidate the concept of advancements, the court relied on the
common law concept of advancements.168 Accordingly, it reduced the shares of the children who
had received land during the decedent’s lifetime.169 This case suggests that in the absence of
relevant statutes, a court can apply an aspect of common law that has no place in customary law.
Recent courts have declined to apply customary law when perceiving that the litigants
were not actually following their customs. In Estate of Wabol, the court declined to view the
oldest daughter as the trustee of family land under Carolinian law, as she had deviated from
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No. 89-850, 4 N.M.I. 149, 1994 WL 413255 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. July 26, 1994).
Id. at 152; see 8 N.M.I. Code § 2102.
166
1 TTC § 102.
167
Estate of Antonio Barcinas, 4 N.M.I. at 153.
168
Id.
169
Id.
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custom when she initiated the division of the family land at issue.170 The court found that it was
therefore not appropriate to apply Carolinian law, and used equitable principles to divide the
property.171
In Diaz v. Taylor172 and Estate of Isaac Kaipat,173 the Superior Court placed the burden
on the party relying on a custom as basis for her claim to convince the fact-finder that she (or the
family) has actually practiced the custom at issue.174 The court noted that without such evidence,
the court would be applying the law of a particular custom where that custom might not exist.175
In Diaz v. Taylor, the court was asked to restore the petitioner to the residence she claimed to be
her family home. The residence had been transferred from the petitioner to a third party via a
non-Chamorro method of conveyance.176 Because the parties had already departed from
Chamorro custom, the court found that the petitioner could not rely on the custom that would
have given her the right to remain in the residence until she died.177 In Estate of Isaac Kaipat, the
court found that litigants (as well as the CNMI Supreme Court addressing an earlier issue in the
case) had not followed the Carolinian culture as described by their own expert witnesses.178
Thus, the court decided to divide the disputed land equitably rather than by custom.
When courts do decide to rely on customary law, evidence of the law may be difficult to
procure. In Estate of Isaac Kaipat, the Superior Court qualified expert witnesses based solely on
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No. 04-0173, slip op. at 3 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2006) (Order Following the October 24, 2006 Evidentiary
Hearing).
171
Id., slip op. at 4.
172
No. 97-0879 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 23, 1997).
173
No. 05-0247 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following Evidentiary Hearing and Denying Heirship
Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen).
174
Diaz, slip op. at 6-7; Kaipat, slip op. at 7.
175
Diaz, slip op. at 7; Kaipat, slip op. at 7.
176
Slip op. at 5.
177
Id., slip op. at 7.
178
Slip op. at 7.

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 61

their purported knowledge of tradition relating to community involvement.179 Witnesses offered
conflicting testimony on the requisites to collect “double” inheritance from both the adopting and
natural parents. The court concluded that witnesses appeared to be uncertain of what actually
constituted the Carolinian culture, and that Northern Mariana Carolinians as a whole seemed to
know little of the Carolinian culture as it existed in its original form in the Caroline Islands.180
The court held that “the culture of the Northern Marianas Carolinians has already changed
greatly from its original form. . . . It is questionable whether the traditional law of the Caroline
Islands can be applied. . . . Following ‘customary’ law may require a shift in the determination of
just what constitutes this law.”181 This decision demonstrates the unreliability of customary law
and the need for legislative clarification.

D.

To what extent should customary law still be applied?
Professor Stanley K. Laughlin Jr. argues that an overzealous application of the laws of

the U.S. Constitution infringes upon local culture and is akin to genocide.182 In 1992, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Wabol v. Villacrusis183 agreed with
Professor Laughlin’s argument that “usually the indigenous culture is very much intertwined

179

See id., slip op. at 2 n.1. The Superior Court took guidance from cases involving expert witnesses in the native
Alaskan community, in which courts qualified social workers with community experience. In re Termination of the
Parental Rights of T.O., 759 P.2d 1308 (Alaska 1988); L.G. v. Alaska, Department of Health and Social Services, 14
P.3d 946 (Ala. 2000).
180
Estate of Isaac Kaipat, No. 05-0247, slip op. at 7 n.4 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following
Evidentiary Hearing and Denying Heirship Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen).
181
Id.
182
Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., The Application of the Constitution in United States Territories: American Samoa, A
Case Study, 2 U. HAW. L. REV. 337, 377 (1981).
183
958 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir. 1992). This matter originally came before the CNMI trial court and was appealed to the
appellate division of the U.S. District Court for the CNMI. The plaintiff then appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals.
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with indigenous control of the land.”184 Accordingly, the court rejected a claim that the U.S.
Constitution prevented the government of the Northern Mariana Islands from restricting land
ownership to people of indigenous ancestry.185
This argument is less compelling when the relative number of people actually practicing
the culture has been dwindling dramatically for some time, when customary law becomes a
trump card186 in a dispute about rights to proceeds from land belonging to a distant ancestor, or
when a culture is so far removed from its ancestral origins that no one really knows the
customary law.
In attempting to discern the customary law, courts are left to sort out the truth from
dubious expert testimonies and an extremely limited source of written anthropological evidence.
Even reliance on the latter is questionable. As much as Alexander Spoehr’s treatise is considered
the authority on Northern Marianas culture, it has been disregarded in litigation. For example, in
Estate of Aguida Amires, the CNMI Supreme Court noted, Spoehr is not accurate when he writes
that “only babies may be adopted.”187 The court relied on testimony from Estate of Rofag to find

184

Stanley K. Laughlin, Jr., Cultural Preservation in Pacific Islands: Still a Good Idea-and Constitutional, 27 U.
HAW. L. REV. 331, 332 (2005)
185
Wabol, 958 F.2d at 1462 (citing Laughlin, Jr., supra note 182, at 386-88).
186
The Superior Court was suspicious of this sort of manipulation in the case Estate of Vicente Camacho, No. 050251 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Feb. 7, 2007) (Order Denying Reimbursement of Funeral Expenses), which concerned the
claim of a son of the decedent who had rendered himself liable for funeral expenses. Claimant had taken the
family’s chenchules—the bundle of donations made to various family members under the Chamorro custom for
defraying funeral expenses—which exceeded the value of the funeral expenses. Id., slip op. at 1. Claimant
nevertheless sought reimbursement of his expenditures from the estate on grounds that he was saving the chenchules
to return to the various donors at their funerals. Id., slip op. at 2. He argued that this was the proper use for
chenchules under Chamorro custom. At an evidentiary hearing, no one presented expert testimony on the Chamorro
custom of chenchule. Id. The judge relied on his own knowledge of the custom of the acceptance of chenchules by
the deceased’s relatives to defray funeral expenses, not to serve as collateral for use at other funerals. Id. The court
granted claimant leave to produce expert testimony to the contrary; he did not do so. Id.
187
No. 95-012, 5 N.M.I. 70, 73, 1997 MP 8, ¶ 20 1997 WL 33480210 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. May 12, 1997).

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 63

that “[n]ormally, the child to be adopted is a baby, but there is evidence that a child who is nine,
ten, or eleven years old could be customarily adopted, depending upon the circumstances.”188
Sorting out the traditional customs of the Northern Marianas is not likely to get an easier
as the culture continues to change. As Professor Herald points out, economic development and
changes toward higher standards of living inevitably result in cultural change.189 The 2000
census showed that the CNMI is home to 44,400 immigrants out of a total population of
69,221.190 According to a second quarter, 1999 census count, the largest ethnic group on Saipan
was Filipino.191 Since children born to these immigrants are automatically U.S. citizens, they
may stay in the CNMI and leave a permanent impact on the culture.192
A 1995 census found only 12,783 Chamorro speakers in the CNMI, out of a combined
Chamorro and Carolinian population of 20,161.193 Many children aged 13 and below do not
speak Chamorro at all.194 The question then arises, what is the prevailing custom from which
customary law should be drawn?
The CNMI Supreme Court in Estate of Rangamar attempted to provide an answer:
188

Id., citing In re Estate of Lorenzo Rofag, No. 89-019, 2 N.M.I. 18, 23 n.3, 1991 WL 70067 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Feb.
22, 1991); see also Estate of Remedio Malite, No. 06-0163 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. May 25, 2006), (Order Confirming
the Mwei Mwei Adoption of Jesus Somol and Recognizing the Estate of Jesus Somol as an Heir to the Estate of
Remedio Malite) (relying on expert witness’s opinion on mwei mwei of older children and disregarding Spoehr’s
suggestion that children were “mwei mweied” as babies and that their surnames were changed to reflect the
adoption)); Arriola v. Arriola, Nos. 97-049, 6 N.M.I. 1, 1 n.1, 1999 MP 13 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Apr. 28, 1999)
(questioning claim regarding custom of a “kiridu” (favorite child) as described by Spoehr).
189
Marybeth Herald, supra note 44, at 747; see also Temengil v. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 881 F.2d 647
(9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 925 (1990) (“The United States' administration of the Trust Territory
produced a rapid change in the economy of the islands, substituting a money economy for the subsistence economy
familiar to the people. . . .Thus the local inhabitants to a large extent lived off the rents obtained from the family
land.”).
190
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands Economic Report, October 2003, at 5,
http://166.122.164.43/jcc/reports/cnmi03.pdf (last visited September 15, 2007).
191
Central Statistics Division, Department of Commerce, The CNMI Current Labor Force Survey: Second Quarter,
1999 Summary, http://www.pacificweb.org/DOCS/cnmi/pdf/992ndlbfs.pdf (last visited September 5, 2007).
192
See Herald, supra note 44, at 747.
193
Beverley A. Lomosad, Say what? Speak Chamorro, Saipan Tribune, Feb. 26, 1999,
http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=1217&cat=3.
194
Id.

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 64

We agree that custom over time may gradually change by a uniform and common
change in practice. However, such changes are neither legally binding [n]or
accepted customs until they have at least existed long enough to have become
generally known and have been peaceably and fairly uniformly acquiesced in by
those whose rights would naturally be affected. Mere agreement to new ways of
doing things by those to be benefitted without the consent of those to be adversely
affected, will not of itself work a sudden change of customary law. 195
This opinion appears to empower the Court to be the cultural keeper of society, capable
of deciding when and if a custom has been around long enough to be enforced upon “those
whose rights would naturally be affected.” Given the increasing intermarriage between people of
Northern Mariana Islands descent and non-natives, 196 as well as the large number of non-natives
involved in land transactions or criminal jury trials, those whose rights may be affected now
include a diverse array of society.
As stated in Estate of Isaac Kaipat, following customary law may require a shift in the
determination of just what constitutes this law.197 Through its initial efforts to codify law into the
1984 CNMI Code, the Legislature seems to have recognized that certain traditions (such as oral
conveyances other than the partida) are unworkable in the modern Northern Marianas. Other
traditions can and should be applied. Rather than allowing the judiciary to decide which customs
to apply and how to apply them, the CNMI Legislature should revise the statutory code to better
address customary law. In the meantime, litigants are subject to an unpredictable application of
statutes, customary law according to the most convincing expert witness, common law according
to the Restatement, or whatever else the court can extract from U.S. jurisprudence.
195

No. 92-029, 4 N.M.I. 72, 77, 1993 WL 614806 (N.M.I. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15, 1993) (citations and internal quotes
omitted).
196
See Estate of Charles Reyes, No. 06-0554 (Petition to Allow Claim by an Omitted Spouse and/or Judgment
against the Estate Arising from Common Law Relationship) (on file with the author, case currently pending before
the Superior Court). Petitioner, a native of the Philippines in a relationship with a Northern Marianas Chamorro,
sought to apply the Chamorro custom of gumagachong (similar to common law marriage) to obtain a share of her
deceased partner’s estate.
197
No. 05-0247, slip op. at 7 n.4 (N.M.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 25, 2006) (Order Following Evidentiary Hearing and
Denying Heirship Claim on Behalf of the Estate of Dolores K. Pelisamen).
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